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Abstract
"Protocol Boosters'' are modules inserted into protocol graphs. They allow the protocol's
behavior to adapt to its environment. Boosters can mask undesirable properties of links or subnets
in an internetwork. The method permits use of proprietary protocols and supports end-to-end
optimizations.
We have implemented Protocol Boosters support in the FreeBSD version of UNIX for Intel
architecture machines. Our prototype embeds boosters in the 4.4 BSD-Lite Internet Protocol (IP)
stack. We have measured the performance of two prototype boosters: an encryption booster (for
passage across insecure subnets) and a compression booster (for passage across bandwidth-impaired
subnets).
Our measurement data suggests that OS support for this method can be constructed with low
performance overhead; execution of the protocol elements dominates any overhead introduced by
our implementation. We discuss some lessons learned from the implementation.

1

Introduction

Network protocols are designed to meet application
requirements for data communications, including security, reliability and performance. The dominant
design and implementation process for protocols has
been to first enumerate the requirements for the protocol, and then design a protocol that provides the
necessary features end-to-end[l6]. The protocol is
then optimized by identifying common cases and implementing fast paths for these cases; TCP/IP is an
example[4]. The resulting protocol is robust end-toend and typically provides good performance. Extremely poor performance can result when the assumptions permitting fast path execution are not
met.

1.1

intended to be transparently inserted into and deleted
from protocol graphs on an as-needed basis.
A policy associated with the booster is used to selectively invoke the protocol functions. For example,
a forward error correction code might be used over a
wireless data link to bring its error behavior into an
acceptable operating range, without using the FEC
end-to-end [13]. The error performance of the subnet
is thus "boosted" to an acceptable level to improve
end-to-end performance. Figure 1 shows a booster
used in a network, in this case boosting a subnet between an end-host and a router.

u$

Protocol Boosters

Protocol gaphs[ll] are a means of representing the
interactions between protocol elements which carry
out functions required by the protocol, e.g., roundtrip time estimation. An approach initially suggested
by Feldmeier, et a1.[8], is the design of "Protocol
Boosters." Protocol Boosters are protocol elements
'This research was supported by the Defense Advanced
Projects Research Agency under Contract #DABT63-95-C0073.
Additional support was provided by the Hewlet&
Packard and Intel Corporations.

Boosted L ~ n kor Subnet

Figure 1: Boosting a link or subnet

Boosters can be dynamically added and deleted as
additional network functionality is needed. A policy
or this decision is needed in addition to the specific
booster mechanism for adding functionality. Since
boosters vary widely in their functions, it is impossi-

f

ble to have a completely general policy; policies must
be associated with their boosters.
These policies can be quite subtle, and may include
definition of "metan-policies. For example, consider
two boosters, one that compresses data, and a second that encrypts it. If compression is performed
first, the later encipherment of data might in fact be
slightly strengthened. However, if encryption is performed first, the compression is unlikely to be effective. A policy module can be devised which properly
structures the interaction of these two boosters, for
example by indicating that the boosters are not commutative.

1.2

Packet Modification

A transparent booster does not modify the packet it
boosts. For example, a Forward Error Correction
(FEC) booster may send FEC packets in addition t o
the data packets it encodes. Non-transparent boosters, on the other hand, modify data packets. For
example, a compression booster for use on a wireless
link might compress data packets.
Transparency has architectural implications; nontransparent boosters are partitioned; the sender
boosts the packet, and a "debooster" at the receiver
dehoosts and recovers the original packet. This is the
situation shown in Figure 1.

1.3

in this environment allows us to evaluate the technique's applicability today in a realistic setting.
Our overall goal is to show that Protocol Boosters
are a good idea. As a first step, we must show that
the idea can be realized with acceptable performance.
To do this, we implemented several example Protocol Boosters embedded in a BSD TCP/IP implementation, and measured the costs and overheads. We
used the FreeBSD implementation of UNIX, operating on Intel Pentium processors interconnected by 10
Mbps Ethernet cards. The availability of freely distributable UNIX sources such as FreeBSD and Linux
has made such machines extremely attractive as OS
development platforms, and allows free distribution
of systems such a s the one we have implemented. It
is our hope that other boosters and improved OS support will result as others absorb and react to our implementations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 motivates particular design choices reflected
in the implementation. Section 3 discusses several example Protocol Boosters. Section 4 discusses aspects
of the implementation in FreeBSD. Section 5 presents
performance data and some inferences we can draw
from it. Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of lessons
learned, new directions and a pointer to the source
for our implementation.

Laver ntl

Implementing Boosters

Implementation of boosters requires dynamic insert,ion of protocol elements into a protocol graph. In
practice, protocol graphs are implemented as executable modules that cooperate via messages or
shared state. Booster support requires inserting and
removing the booster's function from the execution
path followed for a group of packets handled by the
protocol. A simplified illustration of one style of
l~oosteris shown in Figure 2.
While future operating systems[l, 71 may ease userlevel implementation of protocols with good support
for efficient userlkernel boundary crossing and struct,ured user control of devices[6], today's operating systems are ill-suited for such implementation. Access to
system resources needed for high performance, such
as address maps and fine-grained scheduling, leads
t,o protocols embedded in operating systems. The
canonical example is the IP protocol stack embed(led in BSD UNIX. Implementing protocol boosters

Protocol

(a) Unmodified
Stack

(b) Booster-capable

Stack

I

Protocol

I

(c) Boosted
Stack

Figure 2: Insertion of Protocol Boosters in a Layered
Protocol
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Implementation choices and
strategy

As Figure 2 shows, due to its generality and simplicity, the booster abstraction can be used in many

protocol architectures. There is a wide range of implementation alternatives.

2.1

Kernel vs. User level

The initial design choice was whether to run boosters
inside the kernel protection domain, or to operate in
user-space. Each choice has major consequences for
required operating system support.
Running boosters as kernel modules can increase
performance, because of context-switching and other
overheads, as well as availability of control and information about arriving packets. As many boosters
commit layer violations, such information can be very
important. Unfortunately, boosters as kernel modules are difficult to debug. Boosters running in user
space are much easier to debug, as well as easier to
adapt to other operating systems.
Since one role of boosters is as performanceenhancers interoperating with existing network protocols, we implemented prototype support for boosters as kernel modules. This decision should be reexamined as technology advances.

2.2

Platform choice

We added support to FreeBSD, a free Unix clone for
the Intel x86 processor architecture. There were two
reasons: (1) no cost for a free BSD Unix inspired OS
and its source code, and (2) excellent documentation;
[18] has an excellent treatment of the BSD networking
code. The placement of this implementation in the
IP stack is shown in Figure 3.
In our prototype we simplified the policy decision
for boosting: all packets destined to (or sourced from)
a specific IP address are boosted or de-boosted as necessary. This choice allowed us to investigate the OS
performance independent of policy research and development. This is accomplished by a demultiplexing
algorithm, as illustrated in Figure 3, which examines
the IP address and based on a table lookup, either invokes an appropriate booster or reinserts the packet
in the normal execution path. Insertion or deletion
of booster functionality is thus controlled by choice
of IP address.

2.3

Booster 1

Protocol Layer and implications

,4 completely general environment for protocol boosters would allow placement at any protocol layer. The
key lessons about feasibility and performance of OS

Booster 2
Figure 3: Embedding and selecting boosters in the
FreeBSD IP stack
support can be learned with a prototype operating
at a single layer. The choice of this protocol layer
has important implications for software engineering,
limitations of the prototype, and performance measurement. We used the IP layer.
The major software engineering issue other than
kernel- vs. user-space placement is interacting with
the existing layers. We defer discussion of Software
Engineering until Section 4.3, after the implementation details are discussed.
Several limitations were introduced by using the
IP layer. These were related to packet fragmentation and reassembly and multipath routing, and are
a direct consequence of operating at the IP layer.
Packet fragmentation and reassembly is performed
by IP at hosts to avoid the performance cost of repeatedly carrying it out as packets traverse an internetwork. A Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) is
determined for an IP route, which has the property
that it requires minimal fragmentation and reassembly. Where a link has a smaller Maximum Transfer
Unit (MTU) than the packet size, the packet is fragmented into pieces of MTU size or smaller. The debooster receives the original boosted packet as two
(or more) packet fragments. This presents a problem
where the booster functionality requires the entire
original packet. Since this requirement is boosterdependent, our prototype OS implementation by supplies the MTU of the outgoing interface to the booster
so it can act appropriately.
Multipath routing occurs since Internet packets are
not guaranteed to be delivered, take a particular
route, or arrive in-order. TCP addresses the first
and third problems as an IP overlay. This IP be-

havior can present a problem for boosters, especially
non-transparent boosters where appropriate deboosters or state necessary t o deboost the boosted packet
are not present. It also complicates inserting and
deleting boosters a t necessary locations in an IP internetwork. While routes rarely change, as shown by
Claffy[3] in her studies of Internet traffic, such routing
dynamics can be addressed by future protocol boosters.
The ability t o measure performance in a convincing and reproducible manner was our highest priority.
Since application performance is an excellent measure of end-to-end performance, measurement of delay and throughput was performed with widely-used
t,ools which measure these parameters using IP protocols and sockets. Thus, we had t o implement at the
I P layer or below to use these tools. The results suffer in reproducibility if we use subnet specific boosters; the first subnet-independent layer is the I P layer.
This argued strongly for an IP-layer implementation;
we discuss the specifics of performance measurement
in Section 5.

3

Prototype Boosters

We have implemented two example boosters: an encryption booster (for passage across insecure subnet,s) and a compression booster (for passage across
bandwidth-limited subnets). Both boosters have a
trivial policy mechanism in which a booster is inserted or removed from the protocol graph by explicit
user requests.

3.1

Lempel-Ziv Compression Booster

Lempel-Ziv is a commonly used compression algorithm which finds duplicate strings and replaces the
repeating occurrences with a pointer back to the original instance[l9]. In the case of limited bandwidth
net,works, a compression booster might increase endto-end performance, reducing required throughput,
at t,he cost of increased CPU activity. Compression
of various packet components has proven successful
for low-bandwidth networks[l2].
Placing compression at the network level enables
all network services t o benefit from compression without any added user-level complexity. Sophisticated
policy mechanisms can be put in place with the compression booster t o detect the proper conditions for
insertion into and removal from the protocol graph.

For instance, a typical problem in congestion detection and avoidance is propagating the network information across a WAN. However, a sophisticated
policy/compression module could address congestion
somewhat differently and immediately compress network streams based solely on information gathered
locally, such as packet loss information used by TCP
in making flow control decisions.

3.2

Lucifer, an Encryption Booster

Lucifer is an encryption algorithm developed by IBM
in 1971; it was a precursor to the now heavily used
DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm[21]. In
the case of sensitive data traveling over an insecure
subnet, an encryption booster can transparently increase the security of the network services provided.
As with many software-based encryption techniques, the performance of the encryption booster as
shown in Section 5 is poor due t o its CPU-intensive
nature. Naturally, encrypting the data with special
purpose hardware would improve performance significantly, and this could easily be done with a booster
which detects and uses such hardware.
The performance of software-based encryption
highlights an important point. For sensitive data
traveling between secure clouds, it may be less expensive to encrypt the data only over the insecure hop
thereby reducing CPU cost on the endpoints. For example, the boosted link in Figure 1 might be insecure,
and the policy module could detect this by destination IP address or other means. Moreover, with the
use of special purpose hardware, one could multiplex
the hardware across many possible endpoints.
The Lucifer booster is based on widely-available
code written by one of us and published in
Schneier[l7]. Converting this Lucifer code from a user
program to a network protocol booster required less
than a hour.

4

Implementation in FreeBSD

The majority of OS support as well as the booster
modules are loadable kernel modules. The remaining
OS support is modifications to the kernel networking
code. The modules are loaded with an ioctl() system
call. Our modified kernel can dynamically load and
unload support for protocol boosters.

4.1

Initial BSD network stack

When a datagram arrives at the hardware interface,
the hardware puts the datagram into the IP input
queue and schedules a software interrupt to execute
t,he IP input routine[l8]. This routine processes each
datagram on its input queue and returns when the
entire queue has been processed. During processing,
the IP input routine verifies the IP header checksum,
processes I P options and forwards the datagram if
necessary. If the datagram has reached its final destination, it is passed to the appropriate higher-level
protocol.
On output[l8], higher-level protocols like TCP and
UDP fill in as much of the datagram as they can, e.g.,
the TCP header, and then pass the datagram to the
IP output queue. This fills in the remaining fields
in the IP header, like the checksum, determines the
outgoing interface to pass the datagram to, fragments
t,he datagram if necessary and then calls the interface
output function.

4.2

to i p i n t r 0 to finish processing the packet. Figure
3 illustrates much of this behavior.
4.2.3

Output

A packet can arrive a t the IP output routine
ip-output() in two states : boosted or unboosted.
If it is boosted, then the packet is destined for another host, and has been passed t o ip-output 0 by
i p f orward(). If it is not boosted, then it may either be coming from the local host, or it may have
also come from i p f orward (1.
All outgoing packets are passed to the PB output
routine. This routine determines whether to boost,
deboost or simply forward the packet before sending it out. The packet(s) are then passed back to
ip-output () which processes and fragments them as
appropriate before sending them to the hardware interface.
4.2.4

Booster interface to OS

Protocol Booster support in the The interface with the kernel is simple. It can be
viewed as consisting of basically two functions - one
network stack
to boost and the other to deboost. Minimal examples

The basic architecture of our implementation in the of such functions are given in Figures 4 and 5.
The booster registers these functions by inserting
IP stack is illustrated in Figure 3. The followingsubfunction
pointers to them into a lookup-table. This
sections explain how it is done.
table is then used to demultiplex incoming and outgoing packets. The function called on output of a packet
4.2.1 Identifying boosted packets
(2. e., the boosting function) is passed 4 parameters In the IP header, the type-of-service is field is not a pointer to the original mbuf chain containing the
wed. We used this field to store the booster id of packet, a pointer to the contiguous memory block
boosted packets. If boosters need headers or trail- into which the packet has been spilled, a pointer to
ers added to packets, they must allocate space and memory that has been allocated to it (the booster)
perform the appropriate checksumming themselves. and the MTU of the interface on which the packet is
being sent. The deboosting function, usually called
when a packet is received, is passed the same param4.2.2 I n p u t
eters except for the MTU size.
When a packet arrives at an interface, it is passed to
Since boosters can generate new packets as well as
the IP input routine ( i p i n t r o ) by the hardware. If modifying the old ones, they are required to fill in a
t,hr packet is destined for another host, it is passed data structure that indicates the packet(s) generated.
on t,o ip-f o r w a r d o , which forwards packets appro- This data structure consists of a linked list of pointers
priately. If the current machine is the final desti- to the start of packets and the length of these packriation, the packet is passed to the protocol booster ets. We process this linked list to extract the packets
input routine. At this point, the packet consists of and repackage them into mbufs which can then be
t,hc IP and TCP headers as well as whatever data is processed by the rest of the networking code.
in it,. The protocol booster (PB) input routine determines whether the packet is boosted or not; if it is 4.2.5 Protocol Layer
riot., it. returns at once. Else, it passes the packet to
t.lle appropriate debooster routine, which attempts to While our implementation supports boosters at the
deboost the packet and return the deboosted packet IP layer, it would be easy to add booster support that

int null~boost(struct mbuf *mO,
char *pcPacketBuffer,
char *pcPlayground,
int iMtu0ut)
C
register struct ip *ip = (struct ip *) pcPacketBuffer;
ip->ip-tos = ip->ip-p;
ip->ip-p = IPPROTO-PBOOSTERS + PB-BID-NULL;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo = (SegmentInfo *) pcPlayground;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo->pcPacketStart = pcPacketBuffer;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo->iPacketLength = m0->m-pkthdr.len;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo->pNextSegment = NULL;
return (0);

1
Figure 4: Example Null Booster for FkeeBSD

int null~deboost(struct mbuf *mO,
char *pcPacketBuffer,
char *pcPlayground)

C
register struct ip *ip = (struct ip *) pcPacketBuffer;

SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo = (SegmentInfo *) pcPlayground;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo->pcPacketStart = pcPacketBuffer;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo->iPacketLength = m0->m-pkthdr.len;
SegmentInfo-pSegmentInfo->pNextSegment = NULL;

return(0) ;

1
Figure 5: Example DeBooster for FreeBSD
works at the TCP or UDP levels (above IP in the a linked list containing a datagram if the datagram's
stack), or one a t the Ethernet level, which is below length exceeds the size of a single mbuf.
IP in the stack.
We began by passing the packets t o the boosters as
the mbufs in which they were encapsulated. However,
the mbuf structure proved awkward to manipulate,
4.3 Software Engineering
particularly for boosters that operate on contiguous
pieces of data, e.g., the compression booster.
4.3.1 Interacting with Mbufs
We allocate a 32KB memory buffer in which we
FreeBSD's network information and datagrams are gather packets as they arrive. A booster is passed
stored and processed in mbufs (memory buffers). a pointer to this contiguous region of memory. We
Mbufs have a maximum size and are chained into allocate an additional 32K chunk of memory used by

provided an understanding of the delay overhead imposed by boosters, and allowed us to quantify perbyte and per-packet overheads.
We analyzed the throughput of the resulting network stacks using the netperf tool[lO]. We have experimented with both t t c p and netperf, and have
drawn two conclusions from these experiments. First,
netperf results are reproducible; t t c p measurements
exhibit significant variation in reported throughput
- up to 20% in some cases. Second, netperf results
4.3.2 Kernel-awareness and user-level calls
correspond very closely with maximum t t c p reported
Implementation issues which are of minor conse- throughputs. What this suggests is that netperf betquence in user space can have devastating side-effects ter controls the variables under study, while reducing
if errors are introduced in the kernel protection do- noise from other factors.
main. Our sample boosters (compression and encryption) were all essentially constructed by simply
5.1 Delay measurements
taking the skeleton algorithm of existing applications
(Lempel-Ziv, Lucifer, etc.) at the user-level and turn- Figure 6 shows the variation in ping round-trip times
ing it into the main routine for the booster modules. with packet sizes ranging from 60 to 1400 bytes and
The implementations made calls to user-level li- different boosters.
braries, or to system calls. Since these are not availFigure 6 shows that there is virtually no differable in the kernel, we had to implement any required ence in delay between a kernel with booster support
functions. Memory allocation was particularly ob- enabled and an unmodified F'reeBSD kernel. The
scure, so our implementation provides each booster overhead added by a "null" booster ( 'spilling' the
with a pointer to 32K of allocated memory which the packet and reassembling it into mbufs) is incurred by
booster is expected to manage.
all boosters. This overhead is very small, between
Authors of boosters in our prototype must be 0.1 and 0.2 ms, and remains constant with increas'kernel-aware'. However, it is undesirable for the ing packet size, implying that the cost is per-packet,
authors of boosters to completely master FreeBSD rather than per-byte.
internals. More complex boosters will require more
The Lempel-Ziv booster is much more expensive
powerful and extensive services. A clearly-defined, than the null booster for small packet sizes, but
powerful interface to the kernel should be imple- the cost decreases with increasing packet size. We
mented to provide the most important facilities avail- attribute this to increasing compressibility with inable to user-level applications; this would greatly ac- crease in packet size, so that the increase in procelerate importing existing code into a kernel-resident cessing time is offset by the decrease in the time
booster framework.
needed to transmit the data. The Dumb-LempelZiv booster, which compresses the data but sends the
original packet rather than the compressed one, be5 Performance Evaluation
haves as expected - round-trip ping times increase
linearly with time, reflecting the processing overhead
The goal of our performance evaluation experiments involved in compressing the packet. It might seem
was to measure the overhead introduced by our im- odd that the Dumb-Lempel-Ziv booster ever outplementation as well as the costs of executing the ex- performs the Lempel-Ziv booster. The Lempel-Ziv
ample boosters. Our experimental setup consisted of booster compresses the packet at the source, transtwo 133 MHz Intel Pentium processors equipped with mits the compressed packet and decompresses it at
32MB of E D 0 RAM with support for burst reads, a its destination, while the Dumb-Lempel-Ziv booster
256IiB pipeline write back cache, and 3COM 3 ~ 5 0 9 performs the compression computation at the source
ISA Ethernet cards operating at 10 Mbps.
but sends the uncompressed packet, bypassing deWe recorded the roundtrip times of ICMP ECHO compression at the destination. Therefore the Dumb(ping) packets of varying sizes between the two hosts, Lempel-Ziv booster starts to outperform the Lempelwith a number of different boosters installed. This Ziv booster when the additional time required to de-

the boosters in their processing.
While slightly constrained, implementing each of
our sample boosters became very simple. The current FreeBSD kernel network data structures restrict
schemes like protocol boosters, Application-specific
Safe Handlers[7] and SPIN[l] modules. To exploit
ideas from these new systems, the FreeBSD kernel
must be made more "extension-friendly".

No booster support -6Booster support, no booster installed .+.Null booster
Lempel-Ziv booster -x.

-
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Figure 6: Ping round-trip times
compress the packet exceeds the time gained by transmitting a compressed packet. With increasing packet
size and compression gain, this discrepancy lessens
until Lempel-Ziv starts to outperform Dumb-LempelZiv.
The roundtrip times of the Encryption booster are
very large even for small packet sizes; only the time
for the smallest packet is shown in Figure 6 (it is in
the upper left corner of the plot). The other times
are correspondingly ridiculous.

5.2

Throughput measurements

Netperf uses a client-server model to measure the
throughput, with one machine acting as the server to
the others client. We measured bulk data transfers
using TCP and BSD sockets.
The experiments used the test setup described at
the beginning of this section, the modified kernel, and
no other machines on the Ethernet link. The experiments were repeated until a 99% confidence interval
in the results was reached, using an option provided
by netperf. The command line used was:
netperf -F d e s i g n . t x t -H logos -I 99,5
-i 10,2 -1 60

Table 1 shows the results of our tests. The first
column in the table shows the code path being executed, the second column shows the throughputs obtained by netperf, and the third shows the percentage change in throughput relative to a kernel with no
booster support installed, which is given as the first
row of the table.
The additional processing overhead incurred by our
FreeBSD support for protocol boosters has a negligible impact on throughput; with no booster installed,
throughput stays the same (7.21MBitlsec). For
the null booster, with the associated packet spilling
and resegmentation costs, throughput decreases by
0.01%, from 7.21MBitIsec to 7.15MBitIsec.
The measurements also indicates the effect on
throughput when boosters which perform significant
processing are employed. The Lempel-Ziv booster
performs Lempel-Ziv compression, as described in
Section 3, and then sends the compressed packet; the
Dumb-Lempel-Ziv booster also executes the compression code but sends the original packet, thus incurring
all of the cost but none of the benefits of the LempelZiv booster. This provided us with an upper bound
on the cost of the Lempel-Ziv booster. The Crypto
booster encrypts its data stream using the Lucifer[21]
algorithm.

Stack configuration
No support installed
Support installed, no booster
Null booster
Lempel-Ziv booster
Dumb-Lempel-Ziv booster
Crypto booster

Throughput
(MBit/s)
7.21
7.22
7.15
9.42
5.22
0.34

Percent
Change
0.00%
0.00%
-0.01%
30.65%
-27.60%
-95.28%

Table 1: Netperf statistics
The Lempel-Ziv booster improves performance by
up to 30%, approaching the maximum link-level
bandwidth when compressible data (such as text files)
is being sent. The throughput obtained with the
Dumb-Lempel-Ziv booster provides an estimate of
the worst-case behavior, decreasing throughput by
up to 28%. This is encouraging, implying as it does
that even a relatively unsophisticated implementation of the proposed technique for protocol enhancement produces significant performance gains in some
fairly common cases.
The Crypto booster, on the other hand, decreases
throughput to 5% of its normal value. Since the costs
incurred by the OS support are negligible, this decrease in throughput comes from computations for
encrypting and decrypting the data stream. Clearly,
inefficient or computationally expensive boosters may
cause dramatic reductions in throughput.

5.3

Installation costs

Boosters are intended to be added and deleted dynamically to react to network dynamics. In our prototype, this is done from the user level. Inserting
the module for booster support into the running kernel takes an average of 30ms (29000 ps). Adding an
actual booster takes an average of 20ms (19000 ps).
Both of these are times spent executing in the kernel
on account of a user-level ioctl() request, and exclude
concurrency-control costs.
Where a booster's functionality is dynamically inserted and deleted under control of a kernel-resident
policy module, the operations can be considerably
faster. The simple kernel data structure operations
consist of three pointer updates. These can be accomplished while a single processor-priority based lock is
held. The cost of lock acquisition and release is less
than 100 instructions.

6

Relation to other work

The University of Arizona's z-Kernel[ll] work provides support for composing protocols from simpler
elements. Protocol boosters are examples of such elements, but they are inserted "on-the-fly". More recent work on the Scout[l4] project seeks to use compiler technology to optimize protocol stacks by reducing them to minimal sets of functions. This optimization approach is static, where a general protocol
architecture is pared away by optimization technology to achieve a high-performance protocol. Protocol
boosting, in contrast, is additive and dynamic; protocol boosters are added when necessary.
Dynamic modification of protocols is not a new
idea; for example the notion of building a FILO
queue (stack) of reentrant modules is embedded in
the UNIX System V STREAMS implementations
patterned on Ritchie's Streams[l5]. Unfortunately,
Streams are restrictive with respect to flow control (they resemble a string of co-routines), module scheduling, and intermodule messaging. Boosters
have a smaller set of such restrictions, in fact they
are in practice almost unrestricted. This means that
the range of protocol architectures which can be implemented is enhanced; for example there are protocol features (e.g., multiplexers) which are difficult
to implement with the implicit flow control of the
STREAMS message-passing discipline, and easy to
implement with boosters.
For example, composition properties are essential for the many-to-one, one-to-many, and many-tomany forms of multiplexing in communications systems. The "waits-for" dependencies used to schedule coroutines would force multiplexers (and demultiplexers) to be single-threaded and data-driven, rather
than clock or priority driven.
Protocol boosters have a strong intellectual relation to the application-specific services approach sug-

gested by the University of Washington's SPIN[l]
project for building an extensible microkernel. A different tack is followed by MIT's Exokernel[7]; the
Exokernel concentrates on allowing applications to
specify almost all elements of their OS substrate,
without focusing specifically on network protocols.
Application-specific Safe Handlers (ASHs) are most
similar to protocol boosters. A major difference is
the focus on protocols in our work; it lets us take
advantage of considerable structure inherent in protocols. OS support for protocol boosters occupies a
middle ground of generality between STREAMS and
an extensible OS.

from many details such as kernel memory allocation,
and let them focus on the algorithms used in the
boosters themselves. From a software and protocol
engineering perspective, it would save effort, since
many boosters have common support needs.

7.1 Summary

Our prototype shows that it is possible to dynamically insert and delete protocol elements in a conventional TCP/IP stack operating under UNIX. Support
for these "protocol boosters" can be implemented efficiently; there is a very small performance cost relative
to the cost of executing the protocol element's functions. We analyzed these costs using both network
7 Suggestions for further work throughput and network delay measurements made
with widely-available tools; our source code can be
and Conclusions
obtained via anonymous FTP2 for those wishing to
Sophisticated policy modules are clearly essential for replicate our measurements or experiment with new
many classes of dynamic behavior. Our prototype boosters.
implementation requires users to explicitly ask for
boosters to be inserted and deleted. Automating
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